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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant, '

vs.
JAMES P. SANDMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.

\

)

Case No.
8202

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal, taken by the State, is from the District
Court's dismissal of a charge against defendant of the
crime of resisting an officer attempting to discharge a duty
of his office. The statute allegedly violated by defendant
is Sec. 76-28-54, U. C. A. 1953, which reads:
"Every person who wilfully resists, delays or
obstructs any public officer in discharging, or at-
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tempting to discharge, any duty of his office, when
no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable

:;: * * "

After complaint was filed in the Heber City Justice
Court (R. 7) the defendant by stipulation waived preliminary hearing, reserving however his right to challenge the
sufficiency of the pleadings and to move to dismiss in District Court (R. 13). The District Attorney then filed the
information (R. 14) and the bill of particulars (R. 16-17).
The relevant portion of the information charges:

"* * * that on the 18th day of July,

1953,
in Wasatch County, State of Utah, at Stinking
Springs in said Wasatch County, the said defendant
wilfully resisted Leo A. Cox, a public officer and
Game Warden of the State of Utah, in attempting
to discharge a duty of his office, contrary to the
provisions of and in violation of the provisions of
Section 76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953."

The allegations of the bill of particulars are:
"1. That on or about the 18th day of July,
1953, at a place commonly known as Stinking
Springs, in Wasatch County, Utah a game warden,
one Leo A. Cox, while on duty in the performance
of his duties as a game warden of the State of Utah,
in the daytime, observed the defendant, James P.
Sandman, while said Sandman was fishing at Stinking Springs, and was using. what appeared to be
hamburger or ground meat for bait. That upon observing the use of the type of bait above described
by the defendant, said Leo A. Cox identified himself
to the said defendant as a game warden of the State
of Utah and asked to see the defendant's bait; and
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at such time the said defendant, while the hook and
bait with which he was fishing was in the water,
moved the hook and bait back and forth in an apparent effort to dislodge such bait and thereupon,
the said Leo A. Cox told him not to do that and
grabbed hold of the fishing pole held by the defendant in an effort to prevent the dislodging of the
bait, and in a scuffle which ensued both Leo A. Cox
and the defendant fell into the water and while said
Leo A. Cox was attempting to regain his feet while
holding on to the pole he was violently struck in the
face and about the head by the defendant.
"2. That defendant violated the provisions of
76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in resisting an
officer in the discharge of his duties, the penalty
being set forth in such statutory provision.
"3. That the said Leo A. Cox was acting within the authority of the law and the scope of his
duties, pursuant to the provisions of the statutes of
the State of Utah and particularly the provisions of
Section 23-3-11, U. C. A., 1953; Section 23-3-7, U.
C. A., 1953, as amended by the Session Laws of
1953; Section 23-3-21, U. C. A., 1953 and Section
76-28-39, U. C. A., 1953."
At the trial, and after the prosecutor had made his
opening statement, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss, which was read into the record (R. 24-25). The motion was granted, defendant was released, and his bail
exonerated (R. 28). The apparent reason for the court's
ruling appears at R. 27. The court's language is:
"THE COURT: The Court has come to the
conclusion that the motion should be granted unless
the State of Utah is prepared to prove that an ar-
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rest was made before any altercation occurred between the parties."
The prosecutor then made an offer of what the State intended to prove (R. 28-29), which offer included no claim
of arrest or attempted arrest.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The issue presented by this appeal is one of substantive
law: whether the allegations of the bill, and the offer of
proof, would if established beyond a reasonable doubt
amount to a violation of Sec. 76-28-54, U. C. A. 1953. The
information, from the pleading standpoint, validly charges
the crime. Many earlier rules of criminal pleading were
changed in 1935 by legislation. By the Act of 1935 (Sec.
1, Ch. 118, Laws '35), which is now Sec. 77-21-8, U. C. A.
1953, the tests for the validity of a criminal pleading were
set down by the Legislature. Sec. 77-21-8 reads:
The inforn1ation or indictment may
charge, and is valid and sufficient if it charges the
" ( 1)
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offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted
in one or more of the following ways :
"(a) By using the name given to the offense
by the common law or by a statute.
"(b) By stating so much of the definition of
the offense, either in terms of the common law or of
the statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give
the court and the defendant notice of what offense
is intended to be charged.
"(2) The information or indictment may refer to a section or subsection of any statute creating
the offense charged therein, and in determining the
validity or sufficiency of such information or indictment reg:lrd shall be had to such reference."
This information sufficiently charges the offense. The
tests of Subsection ( 1) (b) and Subsection ( 2) are both
met. Plainly, defendant was sufficiently put upon notice
of the statute which he has been charged with having violated. An examination of the bill of particulars indicates
with clarity and in detail the acts which defendant allegedly
committed that allegedly amount to the crime charged. Defendant's right to know what he must defend against is
fully satisfied by the pleadings.
The question here then is whether the facts alleged
amount to the crime charged. The only decision of our
Supreme Court construing Sec. 76-28-54 is State v. Beckendorf, (1932) 79 Utah 360, 10 P. 2d 1073. That case reversed the conviction of a woman charged with wilful obstruction of officers "* * * being then and there engaged in the lawful arrest of the said Martha Beckendorf."
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The proof offered was that the officers, with a search and
seizure warrant for liquor, entered defendant's house and
found her destroying liquor. Defendant kicked an officer
in the groin, threw a jug which cut him, threatened with a
knife and escaped through a window. The court held that
the evidence failed to support the information, there being
no proof of an arrest or an attempt to make an arrest, as
the inforn1ation had alleged. The defendant was not told
that she was to be arrested, although there had been ample
opportunity for the officers to have done so. The court, in
the Beckendorf case, carefully set down the scope of its
decision, and in so doing notes a distinction which is important for the instant case. The court stated ( 10 P. 2d,
at 1075) :
"The information charges defendant with delaying and obstructing officers then and there engaged in her lawful arrest. The defendant was not

charged with· obstructing and delaying officers engaged in searching for intoxicating liquor." (Italics
added.)
The implication to be drawn from the italicized language
is that the result would have been different had the pleadings alleged a lawful search.
The Beckendorf case is not apposite. The case is an
application of the settled rule that the proof must support
the pleadings. This defendant can take no comfort from
the case and in fact it if anything rather supports the
theory of the prosecution.
The court below apparently made this basic assumption: a prosecution for resisting an officer in the perform-
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ance of official duties does not lie unless the prosecutor
pleads and proves an arrest or an attempted arrest. Appellant contends that this is not the true rule. Were that the
rule, the difficulty imposed upon officers who enforce our
game laws is manifest. Unpleasantness, and worse, would
be inevitable. Game laws would be less efficiently enforced,
or many civil suits for false arrest would result. It simply
would not comport with common sense for the law to require that a warden formally place a fisherman under
arrest before asking to inspect a bait which the officer has
reason to believe is unlawful. If, in fact, the bait is unlawful, then is the time when an arrest makes sense.
The general purpose of this statute is to prevent obstruction of or resistance to the efforts of a law enforcement officer to perform any duty enjoined upon him by
la~~. The cases are not limited to resisting arrest. A wide
variety of official duties, if resisted or obstructed, form a
basis for prosecution for this offense. As is said in 67 C.
J. S., Obstructing Justice, p. 51-2 (with supporting footnotes set out below) :
"Various acts have been held to constitute the
offense, 6 such as blocking by defendant, with his
body, the entrance of policemen, to a place which
he admitted to the policemel?- he was using for pool
6Qbstructing citrus fruit inspector-Unauthorized placing of compound in citrus fruit juice which citrus fruit inspector is preparing
to analyze, thereby producing chemical or physical change, is an
offense within a statute providing that it shall be unlawful for any
person to obstruct or resist any authorized inspector in the performance or discharge of any duty imposed on or required of him by law.
-Johnson v. State, 128 So. 853, 99 Fla. 1311. Refusal to leave premises or surrender keys-Refusal of employee of state school for deaf
to leave premises after notified of his. discharge and. refusal. to ~e
liver keys and school property_ to superu;tend~nt constituted vwlatwn
of statute relating to obstructing a pubhc off1cer.-Bathke v. Myklebust, 12 N. W. 2d 550, 69 S. D. 534.
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selling ;7 destruction of milk by a dealer to prevent
inspection as to purity by an officer ;8 exhorting followers to resist officers in execution of an ordinance ;9 refusal of person when arrested for speeding
to give his name and attempting to push from his
automobile the arresting officer ;10 refusing to obey
and surrender when arrested ;11 and use of forcible
means in the presence of the officer to interfere
with his custody of property." 12
In State v. Pope, 4 Wash. 2d 421, 103 P. 2d 1089, an
officer executing a writ of replevin by entering a house and
removing a refrigerator was forcibly abused by the defendant. The case holds the defendant guilty of "resisting
a public officer engaged in the performance of a legal duty."
In Palmquist v. United States, 149 F. 2d 352, cert. den,
326 U. S. 727, 90 L. Ed 431, 66 S. Ct. 33, revenue agents
on their way to an unlawful still and expecting the transportation of moonshine away from the still, met a truck,
which they crowded from the road. They announced they
were federal officers. Defendant then drove the officers
away with a shotgun. Defendant's conviction was affirmed,
the court stating (149 F. 2d at 353) :
''We do not deem it necessary to discuss the
principles of lawful searches and seizures for the
reason that there was no arrest and there was no
7N. Y.-People v. Frank, 130 N. Y. S. 807, 73 Misc. 1, 26 N. Y.
Cr. 308.
spuerto Rico.-People v. Rivera, 25 Puerto Rico 700.
9Mich.-People v. King, 210 N. W. 235, 236 Mich. 405, 48 A. L.
R. 742.
1oCal.-People v. Martensen, 245 P. 1101, 76 Cal. App. 763.
11 Philippine.-U. S. v. Resaba, 1 Philippine 311.
12 0hio.-Campf v. State, 88 N. E. 887, 80 Ohio St. 321.
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search made of either the truck or the person of the
defendant for violations of the liquor law. There
was no information as to the illegal manufacture
or transportation of liquor gained by the officers'
contact with the defendant on the night in question,
and he is not being tried for any offense that a
search of the truck could have revealed. It is debatable, but unnecessary to decided, whether the
officers in this case were without right, under the
circumstances, to stop defendant's truck, in view of
the information possessed by them, after they saw
its blinking lights and that it was coming from the
direction of a suspected still and on the road in
which a liquor truck was expected, at or about the
time expected. But we do not see how the constitutional rights of a defendant against unreasonable
search can be said to have been violated when there
was no search. None of the evidence necessary for a
conviction in this case was obtained by virtue of a
search, lawful or otherwise, and the motion to suppress the evidence and other kindred defenses were
without merit. The issue in the case is whether or
not the defendant knowingly resisted Federal officers in the attempted performance of their duty.
This was an issue of fact which the jury resolved
against the defendant, with substantial evidence to
support its verdict. Two officers and the truck
driver testified that when the officers first arrived
at the scene Officer Carter announced that they were
Federal officers. If the defendant knew they were
Federal officers, even though he also knew they were
planning to search his truck without a warrant, he,
nevertheless, had no right to assault them with a
shotgun. See Cook v. United States, 5 Cir., 117 F.
2d 374. If the jury had believed that the defendant
truly thought himself to be resisting a hold-up, there
would have been an acquittal, but it found on ample
evidence that defendant knew he was resisting Fed-
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eral officers in the atten1pted performance of official duty."
In State v. Po1vell, 99 Cal. App. 2d 178, 221 P. 2d 117,
defendant vvas convicted of this crime because he struck
a policeman engaged in suppressing a public brawl bet\veen
t\vo women in a cafe. Apparently no warrants were involved in that case, but the offense which the officers were
seeking to suppress took place in the officer's presence.
The reasonableness of Warden Cox's behaviour is obvious. There was no oppression, no justification for defendant's attack. Cox approached, and identified himself
to, a man who was apparently then committing an offense.
The man's immediate response was to attempt to rid himself of and destroy the instrumentality of the crime. Warden Cox merely did the obvious and absolutely necessary
thing. Cox was in this case simply performing a duty enjoined upon hin1 by the Fish and Game Code, i. e., attempting to enforce the prohibition against fishing with unlawful
bait.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully urges that the pleadings give
defendant full notice of the acts which he allegedly committed, and full notice of what criminal offense those acts
allegedly amounted to. If the state can prove the alleged
acts beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has committed a crime. The state should be permitted to present
its case to a jury. The ruling should be reversed and the
case remanded to the District Court with the instructions
to try the case on its merits.

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,

PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON,
Distric·t Attorney,
~JOHN

W. HORSLEY,

Assistant Attorney General.
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